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NUCLEAR POWAER PLANT STANDARDIZATION:
PROMISES AND PITFALLS
LEONARD M. TROSTEN* Aim DAVID M. MooR.E**
Current national energy policy indicates the need to reduce by nearly
one-half' the nine to ten years presently required to design, license, and
construct a nuclear power plant.2 A significant means of achieving
greater efficiency in the licensing process without sacrificing careful
evaluation of proposed plants involves the identification and separate
treatment, ideally in a single proceeding, of issues common to most
plants. With generic issues isolated, the licensing of an individual plant
can focus on questions unique to that facility. In implementing a
standardization policy,3 the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) has
recognized the desirability of a generic approach to the licensing of
nuclear power plants, an area in which issues tend to be complex, the
number of qualified experts relatively small, and separate technical review
proceedings frequently repetitive.
Development of a nuclear power plant from conception to operation
currently includes the following successive stages: site evaluation and
selection, plant selection and design, environmental impact analysis by
*A.B., J.D., Columbia University. Partner, LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae, New
York City and Washington, D.C.
**BS, J.D., University of Virginia. Associate, LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae, New
York City and Washington, D.C.
1. President Nixon has directed that efforts be taken to reduce the licensing and
construction cycle to five or six years without compromising safety and environmental
standards. 120 CoNG. Rinc. S 369 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1974).
2. This lead time is divided approximately into the following periods: two years for
design selection, preapplication site reviews, and preparation of the application; two
years for construction permit reviews, including public hearings; and five to six years
for construction and possible operating license hearings after the construction permit
is granted. Muntzing, Standardization in Nuclear Power, 15 Avom. EN. L.J. 21, 27
(1973).
3. The policy itself is enunciated generally in two AEC policy statements: Com-
mission Policy Statement on Standardization of Nuclear Power Plants (Apr. 28, 1972),
and Statement on Methods for Achieving Standardization of Nuclear Power Plants
(Mar. 5, 1973). The AEC also has employed a generic approach to resolving safety
and environmental questions in recent rulemaking proceedings. See Acceptance Criteria
for Emergency Core Cooling Systems for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Reactors,
Docket No. RM 50-1; Effluents from Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Reactors,
Docket No. RM 50-2; Environmental Effects of the Uranium Fuel Cycle, Docket No.
RM 50-3; Environmental Effects of Transportation of Fuel and Waste to and from
Nuclear Power Reactors, RM 50-4. Presumably, this approach will be merged eventually
with the "standardization" mechanisms now being considered.
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the AEC staff, preliminary design safety evaluation by the AEC staff
and the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), construc-
tion permit hearings, plant construction, final evaluation of design safety
and environmental impact, and, where required, an operating license
hearing.4 It is generally accepted that considerable savings in administra-
tive review for a particular facility could be achieved' if a major portion
of the total plant" utilized a previously approved design.7  Further
savings could be realized if sites, as well as plant designs, received prior
generic approval.8
While the benefits of standardization are evident and acknowledged,
potential problems exist. There are, of course, technological-economic
problems, such as developing system designs which can satisfy various
siting criteria; 9 deciding the extent to which components rather than
criteria should be standardized; and defining interface requirements to
provide compatibility between a standardized system and the remainder
of an individual plant, as well as among the components of the stand-
ardized portion itself.10 More fundamental, however, are concerns that
4. Portions of this process may overlap. For example, staff review of the final design
and the operating license hearing can be completed during the plant construction phase.
The process, nevertheless, is largely sequential.
5. It has been estimated that standardization alone should reduce the development
cycle by approximately two years, primarily by reducing the time required for design
selection and construction permit approval, and ultimately for actual construction.
Muntzing, supra note 2, at 27.
6. One of the fundamental questions involved in the AEC's standardization policy is
the portion of the nuclear power plant which should be the subject of the special
"standardized" licensing regime. A special staff Task Force has recommended that the
Commission's ultimate objective should be to require that applications for approval of
standardized designs encompass at least the safety complex of the plant, which includes
the containment design, auxiliary building, control building, diesel generator building,
and radioactive waste building. Atomic Energy Commission, Report to the Director of
Regulation by the Task Force for the Study of the Reactor Licensing Process 22 (Dec.
1973) [hereinafter cited as Task Force Report].
7. Use of standardization mechanisms also could result in better utilization of the
nation's limited number of nuclear experts, as well as the experience of the nuclear
power industry in design, manufacture, construction, and operation of plants.
8. This possibility is also under serious consideration by the AEC. Remarks by
William 0. Doub, Atomic Industrial Forum Annual Conference, San Francisco, Calif.,
Nov. 12, 1973.
9. Hearings Under 42 US.C. § 2252 Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy,
93d Cong, 2d Sess. (1974) (statement of Harry 0. Reinsch, Bechtel Power Corpora-
tion).
10. Task Force Report, supra note 6, at 3-14. Perusal of invitations to bid currently
being let by utilities reveals the complexity of some of these problems.
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standardization may lead to fewer advances in the areas of safety and
reliability, a decrease in the competitive nature of the industry, and a
lessening of effective public participation in licensing proceedings. This
Article will focus on these issues and suggest methods by which the
AEC can minimize adverse effects of standardization while continuing
to pursue its benefits.'
LICENSING OPTIONS UNDER THE STANDARDIZATION POLICY
After receiving nuclear power industry suggestions concerning
methods for ordering regulatory priorities in the review of generic plant
features,'- the AEC announced in March 1973 that it was prepared to
consider applications for review and licensing of standardized designs
for nuclear power plants and major plant systems.' 3 It described three
procedural options and promised that "priority in scheduling and addi-
tional experienced staff manpower" would be accorded applications
conforming to any one of the options.'4
11. At this writing, the concepts underlying the approaches by the AEC and the
nuclear industry to standardizing nuclear power plants continue to evolve rapidly.
There is considerable discussion concerning the impact of standardization in terms of
designs, components, systems, and techniques; and no definition of a "duplicate" unit,
system, or component has gained general acceptance. Time and experience with new
licensing applications will be required before these matters can be resolved. Standardi-
zation is one of the elements in proposed reforms of the AEC's licensing program
contained in bills introduced by Congressmen Price, H.R. 11957, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973), and McCormack, H.R. 12823, 93d Cong, 2d Sess. (1974). In addition, pro-
posed licensing amendments by the AEC (H.R. 13484, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), intro-
duced by Congressman Price, by request) address the standardization question directly.
See Shapar & Malsch, Proposed Changes in the Nuclear Power Plant Licensing Process:
The Choice of Putting a Finger in the Dike or Building a New Dike, 15 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 539 (1974).
12. On April 28, 1972, the AEC issued a formal statement encouraging efforts of the
nuclear industry toward increased standardization. The statement indicated generally
that "priority consideration" would be given to activities leading to greater standardiza-
tion of nuclear power plants and encouraged utility companies, as the owners of the
plants and thus those who could be expected to receive the most direct benefits, to
assume "the leadership role" in suggesting methods for ordering regulatory priorities
in the review of standardized plants and plant components. This statement, it should
be noted, was an outgrowth of earlier Commission pronouncements over a number of
years encouraging development of codes and standards.
13. AEC News Release No. R-85 (Mar. 5, 1973).
14. Atomic Energy Commission, Statement on Methods for Achieving Standardiza-
tion of Nuclear Power Plants 3 (Mar. 5, 1973) [hereinafter cited as AEC Statement].
On March 21, 1974, AEC Director of Regulation Muntzing suggested a fourth option
called "replication" in testimony before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Hear-
ings on Nuclear Power Plant Siting and Licensing Before the Joint Comm. on Atonic
Energy, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 1 (1974) (statement of L. Manning Muntzing).
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Under the first option, the reference system concept, an applicant is
permitted to seek approval of a design for either an entire facility or a
major portion thereof.'5 Once a standardized design receives AEC
approval, a subsequent application for licensing of an individual plant
need only reference the design. Further radiological safety review would
be limited to examination of the selected site in terms of its compatibility
with the site parameters utilized in the standardized plant design, review
of any non-standard design features, and an environmental impact
analysis in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969.16 It has been recommended that the reference system option, in
conjunction with a system of preselected sites, become the principal
vehicle for reducing licensing and construction time.17
The second option, the duplicate plant concept, envisions a single
review of license applications from one or more applicants for the
construction and operation of duplicate plants at more than one site. As
with the reference system option, individual site-related characteristics
would be addressed separately, but the facility design would undergo a
single review. Thus, to a certain extent, the duplicate plant concept is
an effort to take full advantage of what would occur otherwise on an
ad hoc basis, namely, accelerated review of a design used on a previ-
ously licensed plant. 8
15. When the AEC first announced that it was prepared to accept applications under
its standardization policy, it attempted to restrict applications to "the entire facility, the
nuclear steam supply system alone or in conjunction with containment, or the con-
tainment alone." Id. at 5. Acceptance of applications covering other parts of the
facility were to depend upon "the availability of specialized manpower and the relative
importance of the system to the safety of the plant." Id. at 5-6. Although a Task
Force report envisions reference designs as ultimately encompassing the "safety com-
plex" of nuclear plants, the scope of the systems which can or should be the subject
of standardized design applications remains an open policy question at this time. See
note 6 supra.
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970). If a previously designated site is used, a site
suitability evaluation, including a NEPA analysis, will already have been completed.
Task Force Report, supra note 6, at 17-21.
17. Task Force Report, supra note 6, at 13-16. All four light-water-cooled reactor
vendors have either filed applications under the reference system option or have indi-
cated their intention to do so. Remarks by A. Giambusso, Atomic Industrial Forum
Workshop on Reactor Licensing and Safety, Tables I and 2, Dec. 13, 1973. A number
of architect-engineering firms have also indicated their intention to file standardized
designs under this option. Id.
18. Commonwealth Edison has already submitted an application under the duplicate
plant option covering four identical plants to be built in pairs at locations some fifty
miles apart. Commonwealth Edison Company (Braidwood 1 and 2, Byron 1 and 2),
Docket Nos. 50-454, -455, -456, & -457. In addition, five participating utilities forming
the Standardized Nuclear Power Plant System (SNU'PPS) presently plan to file an
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The third option, the license to manufacture, is thus far the only
standardization mechanism for which new regulations have been pro-
posed and adopted. 9 It is similar in concept to the reference system
option, except that construction of the plant takes place at a location
other than the eventual plant site. Present application of this option
would appear to be limited to barge-mounted power plants.20
SAFETY IMPLICATIONS OF STANDARDIZATION
One of the more important benefits of increased standardization an-
ticipated by the AEC is the enhancement of reactor safety.2' Standardi-
zation should result in better utilization of existing AEC manpower by
permitting concentrated staff effort on in-depth evaluation of standard-
ized systems and resolution of generic safety-related issues.22 In addition,
experience gained in construction, start-up, and operation of a particular
design will be applicable to all plants utilizing that design.
Despite the more efficient initial review procedures possible under
standardization, questions can be raised about the tendency of increased
standardization to create less, not greater, assurance of the most advanced
safety design. Arguably, such a result could occur if equipment vendors
and architect-engineering firms are deterred from incorporating newly
developed safety features into previously approved plant models. Besides
incurring additional review costs, these firms might jeopardize their
ability to attract potential purchasers by proposing alteration of stand-
ardized models to incorporate changes with unknown ramifications.
It should be noted, on the other hand, that the present licensing process
itself offers significant disincentives for design changes. The potential
application covering six plants. Remarks by R. Koprowski, Atomic Industrial Forum
Workshop on Reactor Licensing and Safety, Dec. 13, 1973.
19. 38 Fed. Reg. 30251 (Nov. 2, 1973). The AEC has recently released for comment
proposed regulations for the reference system and duplicate plant options. 38 Fed. Reg.
13668 (Apr. 16, 1974).
20. Task Force Report, supra note 6, at 3-9. Offshore Power Systems, Inc., a joint
venture of Westinghouse and Tenneco, presently is seeking a license to manufacture
eight standardized barge-mounted plants at a shipyard-like facility near Jacksonville,
Florida. 38 Fed. Reg. 34008 (Dec. 10, 1973).
21. AEC Statement, supra note 14, at 2-3.
22. While present intense efforts have enabled the regulatory staff to conduct thorough
safety reviews for each reactor application, improved efficiency in the utilization of
AEG review resources is becoming increasingly necessary as the number of operating
plants and license applications mounts. As of December 31, 1973, there were 42
plants licensed to operate, 56 being built, and 101 on order. AEC News Release No.
T-38 (Jan. 29, 1974).
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for substantial delays in the various licensing stages presents a consider-
able deterrent to vendors and architect-engineers to propose even the
most beneficial changes, since no utility wishes to have its facility delayed
while a test case is made of its application. The situation, indeed, would
probably be improved by separating design approval from the licensing
of individual plants. In any event, there are indications that the AEC
will limit its approval of standardized designs to a specified period in
an effort to accommodate technological and economic changes. -3
Apart from the interrelationship of the AEC regulatory staff with the
utilities, vendors, and architect-engineers, the position of intervenor
groups under the standardization policy must be considered. Under the
present "custom" licensing process in which each application is subject
to a de novo safety evaluation, intervenors are afforded an opportunity
to insist at every such review upon incorporation of design changes that
may offer only marginally greater assurance of protection. The ap-
plicant's desire to expedite the review process may induce it to accept or
at least negotiate the intervenors' proposals. Once a standardization de-
sign has been approved, however, the AEC has stated that it will require
only those modifications which provide substantial additional protec-
tion.24 Furthermore, if a standardized design receives prior generic ap-
proval, the issues which intervenors raise at subsequent individual li-
censing proceedings could be severely restricted.25
Intervenors may object to the loss of their leverage which a change
in the present system would entail. On the premise that pressure from
intervenors in specific hearings has actually resulted in significant safety
improvements, it is at least arguable that changing the system could
lessen the assurance of plant safety. Nevertheless, standardization would
permit intervenors to concentrate their limited technical and financial
resources in a single consolidated proceeding affecting generic features
of a number of power plants. By thus focusing their efforts, inter-
23. The AEC Director of Regulation has stated that "four or five years would seem
to be a reasonable length of time over which to freeze a final design." Remarks by
L. Manning Muntzing, Atomic Industrial Forum Workshop on Reactor Licensing
and Safety 6, Dec. 13, 1973.
24. Remarks by A. Giambusso, supra note 17, at 5.
25. See notes 45-49 infra & accompanying text. It is debatable whether intervenor
participation has, in fact, resulted in significant safety improvements in the design of
specific plants. Compare Hearings on Nuclear Power Plant Siting and Licensing Before
the Joint Conm. on Atomic Energy, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 (1974) (statement of
Harold P. Green, George Washington Univ. Nat'l Law Center) zitb Gulf States Util.
Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-183, at 11-13 (Mar. 12, 1974).
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venors could contribute to nuclear safety in the most timely and effective
manner.
26
Increased standardization clearly is necessary if the present level of
safety review is to be maintained in the face of the growing number of
nuclear power plant applications. It remains open to question, however,
whether a licensing process entailing a generic approach to plant design
can actually enhance the level of review of safety considerations afforded
by current procedures.
EFFECr ON COMPETITION
Section 1 of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, states the policy of
the United States that "the development, use, and control of atomic
energy shall be directed so as to ... strengthen free competition in pri-
vate enterprise." 27 Legislative intent is further evidenced in section 3,
which expresses the congressional desire for a program "to encourage
widespread participation in the development and utilization of atomic
energy for peaceful purposes,". 8 and in section 105, which states directly
that nothing contained in the Atomic Energy Act can relieve a person
from the operation of the antitrust laws29 and requires the AEC to
report promptly to the Attorney General any information which might
indicate a restriction of competition in the atomic energy industry." In
view of this clear congressional mandate, the Commission, in imple-
menting a standardization policy, must be particularly mindful of po-
tential anticompetitive effects.
Competition in the nuclear power industry is rather restricted, and a
significant increase seems unlikely. There presently are only five manu-
facturers of nuclear steam supply systems 31 and only 13 active architect-
26. Intervenors may insist that the standardized designs be the "safest" among various
alternatives. Contrary to the desires of some intervenors, however, it is not the respon-
sibility of the AEC to ensure that a design is necessarily the safest, but only to certify
that the design adequately protects public health and safety. 42 U.S.C. § 2133 (d) (1970);
Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 2), WASH-1218 (Supp.
1) 517, 528 (Nov. 10, 1972). Once that decision is made, and the right is reserved to
require incorporation of newly developed safety features which provide substantial
additional protection, there should be no need for the constant "fine-tuning" which
the present review process tends to encourage.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2011(b) (1970).
28. Id. § 2013(d).
29. Id. § 2135(a).
30. Id. § 2135(b).
31. Of these, four offer light-water reactors, while only one markets the high-
temperature gas-cooled reactor.
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engineering firms. Component manufacturers and vendors are similarly
limited.32 In such a highly concentrated market, the possibility that
standardization might accentuate anticompetitive forces takes on in-
creasing importance.
Recognizing its responsibility to foster competition, the AEC has
sought to counter some of the potentially anticompetitive aspects of its
new policy. Because a vendor with an approved design will enjoy a
marketing advantage over one whose model is still being reviewed, the
Commission has pledged priority and expeditious review to initial sub-
mittals to achieve some parity among the vendors' design offerings. 3
Furthermore, to maintain the competitive opportunities of equipment
suppliers and vendors, staff requirements for plant materials and com-
ponents will be in the form of design criteria, rather than specified
products, wherever possible.3 4
Although these actions of the Commission are commendable, poten-
tial obstacles to increased competition as a result of standardization
remain. Of particular concern is the AEC's apparent intention to
restrict the number of standardized applications it accepts for review.
In the staff study which accompanied the Commission's statement im-
plementing standardization, it was suggested that "reasonable assurance
should be provided that the design will be applied to several units"
before it is accepted for review." Similarly, a recent AEC Task
Force report recommended that standardization applications be limited
to those which have "reasonable commercial utilization or demonstrate
improvements in safety." 36 The anticompetitive consequences which
would follow upon adoption of these suggestions are obvious, inasmuch
as smaller industry members and potential entrants would find it diffi-
32. A survey of vendors in the power reactor field revealed the following: Of 67
plants surveyed, 80 percent of the pressure vessels were supplied by three companies;
of 37 plants surveyed, 70 percent of the reactor internals were supplied by two vendors;
of 105 orders placed for piping for 55 plants surveyed, 60 percent of the orders were
filled by five vendors; of 132 orders placed for safety-related pumps for 50 plants
surveyed, 90 percent of the orders were filled by five companies; of 202 orders for
safety-related valves for 50 plants surveyed, 60 percent of the orders were fillcd by
seven companies; and of all plants surveyed, the pressurizers and steam generators were
provided by only three companies. Task Force Report, supra note 6, at 4-12 to 4-13.
33. It has been indicated that at least initially the AEC will not accept a second
standardized submittal from a firm without giving priority to firms with initial sub-
mittals. Remarks by A. Giarnbusso, supra note 17, at 6.
34. Id. Restrictive specifications can, of course, amount to the designation of a par-
ticular vendor without explicitly naming that vendor.
35. AEC Statement, supra note 14, at 6.
36. Task Force Report, supra note 6, at 22.
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cult to provide the desired assurances. Not so obvious, however, are
the purported benefits to the licensing process of placing limitations on
standardization applications. While such restrictions should tend to
conserve regulatory manpower by limiting the number of applications, it
is not clear that the substantial investment entailed in preparation of a
formal standardization application will not accomplish the same objec-
tive without necessarily favoring established industry members. En-
forcement of such restrictions also raises significant questions. Will
letters of intent or actual contracts from utilities be required for an
application? Or will the AEC itself determine the commercial marketa-
bility of a particular design, as the Task Force report appears to sug-
gest?37 The proposed restrictions have drawn considerable criticism
throughout the industry 3 and should be seriously reconsidered by the
Commission.
Other anticompetitive effects could result depending upon the ulti-
mate course of the Commission's standardization policy. One study has
recommended that utility applicants eventually should be required to
reference a standardized design "except for good cause shown" 30 and
that the standardized design itself ultimately should encompass at least
the entire plant safety complex.40 Because the safety component of a
nuclear plant generally has been the product of two entities, the nuclear
steam system suppliers and the architect-engineers, such a requirement
might well lead to vertical integration in the nuclear power industry.41
Similarly, competition might be disrupted if various industry members
combined to make applications under any of the three standardization
licensing options.4 Indeed, it is conceivable that the duplicate plant
option will prove so popular that the market for smaller suppliers will
shrink seriously, increasing entry barriers. This possibility is substantially
diminished by the difficulties inherent in arranging for a number of util-
ities to build duplicate plants at different sites.
The potential anticompetitive effects of standardization strongly
suggest that the AEC should seek the assistance of the Justice Depart-
ment in formulating its new policy. Such assistance is particularly
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Letter from Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc., to AEC Director of Regula-
tion, Dec. 10, 1973.
39. Task Force Report, supra note 6, at 11.
40. Id.
41. The Task Force report readily admits this possibility. Id. at 4-13.
42. The Justice Department's Antitrust Division, however, has provided a favorable
business review letter for the SNUPPS arrangement (see note 18 supra).
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critical in light of the probability that industry members associated with
plant design and supply will be unable to rely upon the AEC's standardi-
zation policy, as implemented, as a defense to charges of refusal to com-
pete or agreement to limit competition. 3 Antitrust policy, of course, is
not always dominant;44 it must, in many cases, be balanced against com-
peting social goals, such as the need for improving the process of licensing
nuclear plants. Although Justice Department participation in developing
and implementing standardization policy would not eliminate every po-
tential pitfall, it would help ensure that anticompetitive aspects receive
thorough consideration and that AEC policy represents the proper com-
promise between effective regulation and active competition.
STANDARDIZATION AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
Section 189 (a) of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, requires that
the AEC grant a hearing to any person "whose interest may be affected"
by the "granting, suspending, revoking, or amending of any license or
construction permit .... ,,45 Standardization in power plant licensing
raises public participation issues with respect to foreclosure of generic
issues, public notice, and intervenor standing.
Under current procedures, the AEC, before issuing a construction
permit or operating license, publishes a notice of receipt of the applica-
tion and affords interested parties the opportunity to participate in a
public hearing. Implementation of standardization, however, is likely
to result in significant changes in the licensing process. The AEC has
several options, even under existing law, which it could utilize in ap-
proving a standardized design. It could, for example, hold a public
rulemaking or adjudicatory hearing leading to a "generic" approval of
a design. Alternatively, it could approve the standardized design on the
basis of staff review and ACRS comments, reserving public hearings
until applications for individual construction permits are filed.46 The
presence of transitional problems suggests that the Commission should
43. See note 29 supra & accompanying text. It is also possible that a dissatisfied
vendor, architect-engineer, or component manufacturer might attempt to raise such
concerns in a facility licensing proceeding, thereby leading to further delays for affected
nuclear power plants. See 42 U.S.C. § 2135(c) (1970). But see H.R. REP. No. 91-1470,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1970).
44. See Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a) (1970).
46. The Task Force has recommended that both options be available to an applicant.
Task Force Report, supra note 6, at 29.
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permit a variety of procedures for approval of both standardized and
custom designs.
If the Commission gave prior approval to a standardized design ap-
plication, the details of the plant design should not be at issue in the in-
dividual construction permit hearings except to consider whether the
plant actually conformed to the standard design or whether there were
special circumstances which made the standard design inappropriate.
Unless significant new information or other good cause existed to justify
reconsideration of the previously resolved design issues, the construction
permit hearing should be limited to a determination of site suitability
relative to the standard design, as well as consideration of any non-
standard design questions.
Considering that the present practice of relitigating issues in succes-
sive cases is intolerable for all concerned, the policy behind foreclosure
of previously resolved matters is clearly salutary. Indeed, to the extent
consistent with due process, the AEC should apply such a policy to all
licensing proceedings, not just to those involving standardized applica-
tions. If, however, eventual installation sites are unknown or unspecified
when a standardized design is being approved, it will be difficult to
determine who has standing to insist upon a hearing and, more signifi-
cantly, what constitutes adequate notice to justify a refusal to recon-
sider plant design issues in subsequent proceedings.
The standing issue is perhaps the easier of the two to resolve: the
Commission can and should err on the side of permitting intervention
without waiving its right to require consolidation of parties with sub-
stantially the same interest.4 7 To justify foreclosure of previously re-
solved issues, however, the Commission must be able to establish that
it provided fair notice to all interested parties.4 8 Although actual notice
is not required, a substantial effort should be undertaken to reach as
many likely intervenors as possible. In addition to utilizing the Federal
Register, the AEC should notify directly citizen groups known to be
interested in nuclear power plant development and should circulate
public notices in areas which have a reasonable likelihood of becoming
eventual installation sites. Unless such notice procedures are instituted,
47. See 10 C.F.R. 5 2.715a (1973).
48. In this connection, see Brooks v. AEC, 476 F.2d 924, 927 (D.C. Cir. 1973), in
which it was held that "elementary fairness as well as the clear language of section
189(a), demands that the Commission afford notice and an opportunity for hearing"
before extending the completion date of a construction permit.
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delays resulting from litigation of the foreclosure issue may detract
substantially from the full potential of standardization.
Litigation about the rights of intervenors to contest the AEC's ap-
proval of standardized designs in the context of specific facility licensing
hearings could, of course, be reduced if these rights were delineated
more sharply by legislation. 9 In the absence of legislative reform, how-
ever, an overly ambitious attempt to narrow the scope of specific facility
hearings might involve hapless applicants in a welter of controversy over
the ambiguities of new regulations. Moreover, the pace of technological
change itself militates against extreme foreclosure of standardized design
issues. Until there is legislative change, the AEC should utilize the stand-
ardization concept primarily to increase efficiency of staff and ACRS
evaluation of standardized designs by eliminating repetitive review in
this component of the overall licensing process. Reducing the time and
uncertainty involved in staff and ACRS review alone would constitute
a significant improvement in licensing procedures.
CONCLUSION
Although greater standardization inevitably will be required in the
nuclear industry, its impact will not be significant for several years. To
the fullest extent consistent with conservation of regulatory manpower,
the AEC should, for the present, implement a wide range of licensing
options for nuclear power plant development. Discretionary alternatives
are essential not only because of the inherent uncertainties in devising
standardization procedures but also because of the great variety of cir-
cumstances which will confront applicants for facility licenses.
Standardization mechanisms clearly offer substantial potential for ex-
pediting and improving the licensing process. Immediate gains in efficien-
cy may be achieved in the administrative process of staff and ACRS
review. Despite the desirability of according generic treatment now to
the concerns of intervenors, the possibility of serious delays resulting
from efforts in this direction indicates the necessity for additional thor-
ough consideration in the course of pending congressional hearings on
licensing reforms.
49. In order to be most effective, such legislation would have to remove from the
scope of judicial review the AEC's determination that there is no unresolved issue pre-
sented with respect to the standardized design.
